One variant of this argument holds that, while there is no necessary incompatibility between the role of a unionist and the role of a professional, the professionai who joins a union tends to undermine the public image of his professionalism. In the long run, such a stripping away of popular esteem would redound to the detriment of professors as professionals. That is, the public generally, and academic emplovers in particular, would soon fall into the habit of treating faculty members as factory hands. Eventually, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, professors would begin acting accordingly or, at least, would encounter kxtreme difficultv in trying to maintain professional standards. In a sense, then, there are two interkcking arguments that seek to fault unionism by asserting its incompatibility with professional integrity: the first holds that unionism tends to be associated with a low professional self-image and low standards of professional conduct; the second, that unionism tends to produce a low public image regarding professionalism, which may eventuate in a low self-image. Both arguments imply a negative relationship between unionism and professional standards.
The validity of such arguments cannot be assessed in the absence of consensus about what constitutes professionalism. The National Labor Relations Act, for instance, contains what appears to be a highlv precise definition of "professional employee," as follows:
(a) any employee engaged in work ( i ) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes.
And yet, much is left out: nothing is said about "peer evaluation," about a "professional self-image," about how a professional relates to various kinds of "clients," about whether a given level of academic certification (e.g., the Ph.D.) may be deemed essential to the proper exercise of professional responsibilities. Critics of unionization among academic employees have not lost sight of these myriad dimensions of professionalism; indeed, the typical critic uses the tactic of enumerating all conceivable dimensions of professionalism, and then hypothesizing that unionization, ultimatelj-, will be incompatible either with all these dimensions or with some combination of them. An appropriate response by supporters of unionization, then, would consist not merely in raising questions about such hypotheses, but also in challenging what may be a far too broad definition of professionalism. For instance, would it really undermine the professional standards of academicians if they were to share with students the responsibility for designing curricula?
Will Uxions Mnke Us Less Professio~zal? 3
A 1969 survey of 60,028 college and university faculty members, undertaken by the Carnegii Commission and the American council on Education, provided a substantial amount of information about professional standards and union sentiment. For instance, professors who belong to the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) are slightly more likely than their colleagues to emphasize a broad liberal education as oPPOsed to spec;alized training, and to consider themselves intellectuals. On the other hand, A F T professors are slightly less likely than their colleagues to hc involved in communicatio~~ with other specialists in their fields, and they are less likely to publish articles in academic journals. Somewhat the same paitern emerges when we examine collective bargaining attitudes or strike sentiment in relation to these several measures of professionalism. Professors who support collective bargaining and the strike tactic are more likely than other professors to define themselves as "intellectuals." There is a weak, practicallv nonexistent, relationship between attitudes on collective bargaining or the strikk and involvement in research. The tendency for A F T members to have relatively less involveme~lt in research and publication appears to be due primarily to the fact that most large, effective A F T chapters are found at colleges and universities in which little research is carried on. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the relationship between union membership and this aspect of professionalisni at specific tvpes of institutions. The procedure makes it clear that the "incompatibility" of z~;zion membership and research productivity exists almost entirely at the l~i g h quality, high prestige urzi-,.ersities where most of the research takes phce.
In an article on faculty unions, Everett C. Ladd snd Seymour A l . Lipset develop an eleborate set of hypotheses about several factors that allegedly influence union sentiment among academicians. "Professors of low scholarly achievements," they find, "give greater backing to the principles of collective bargaining than do ;heir more productive colleagues." In addition, "liberal to left" professors were found to be "much more pro-union than their conservative colleagues," a relationship that is said to obtain "at all types of institutions and in all age and achievement groupings." And herein lies a paradox: how can scholarly involvement discozlrage unionism while liberalism strengthens it, when there is a strong association between scholarly productivity and a liberal political outlook? As 1,ipset and Ladd have pointed out many t h e s , "faculty of high scholarly standing show up . . . as more supportive of a liberal-left, 'progressive,' and egalitarian politics than their less highly achieving colleagues." Ladd and Lipset trv to explain this anomaly in two ways: first, by showing that "ideology" has a very large impact on unionism, while the "quality" of one's institution has a relatively small impact; secondlv, . by . arguing that "highly achieving academics . . . are significantlv cross-pressured with regard to faculty unionism: their liberalism would incfine them to support it; but their objective interests and the general structure of their academic values bring them into opposition. And . . . the latter cor~sideratio~rs typically prove decisive."
TYhen subjected to a more detailed statistical analysis, Ladd and Lipset's speculations turn out to be untenable. First, it should be noted that Ladd and Lipset provide no evidence for the italicized portion of the generalization quoted above: it remains to be seen whether professors subject to cross pressures of the kind $ COLLEGE EXGLISH described tend to reconcile those pressures bv adopting an anti-union posture. Secondly, professors of high scholarly eminence, although thev do indeed tend to be of a liberal political outlook, are often surprisingly illibeial with regard to issues "within the cloisters" such as academic reform br "student power," and this small streak of illiberality may well applv to the issue of faculty unions. Lipset himself, in an effort to. resolve a similar.paradox, once made a distinction between "economic" and "non-economic" liberalism: perhaps a distinction between "academic" and "non-academic" liberalism would also be in order. Finally, and most importantly, the evidence indicates that there is no incompatibility between scholarly productivity and attitudes favoring unionism. Indeed, when other factors are taken into account, there is a slight tendency for high levels of scholarly achievement to be associated with an increase in support for faculty unions.
Ladd and Lipset's analvsis attempts to separate the effects of class factor (e.g., age, salary, scholarly involvement) from ideological factors (e.g., liberalism, attitudes toward student activism) as determinants of support for unionization. An essential part of their argument is that, at the more prestigious institutions, a high degree of scholarly eminence tends to impede unionization, while "liberalism" tends to support it. Empirical data clearlv indicate that while the latter part of this generalization is valid, the first is not. At everv tvpe of institution, ideological factors such as support for campus activism, leftism, and support for academic reform strengthen one's commitment to unionization, while age, salary, and scholarly achievement-the "class" factors-have little impact. In most instances, in fict, scholarlv achievement has a slight positive impact on support for unionization. ,4t the high quality universities where, according to Ladd and Lipset, scholarlv productivitv is sharplv incompatible with union support, the very opposite tends-to be true: ;he more productive scl~olars have a slight tendency to favor unionization. These results are highly encouraging for those who wish to organize professors on the basis of their broad political convictions rather than their "class" position. As a final observation it should be noted that, although most faculty unions are found at the least prestigious institutions, there is actually little variatjon in attitude toward unionism from one tvpe of institution to the nest.
On believe in unionism tend also to believe that their peers-other professors-should share the power of evaluation with students. On this criterion, then, professors who support unionism would score low on professionalism. The practice of regarding students as "clients" rather than "colleagues" or "peers," however, is a highly questionable one, and until that issue is resolved it is almost meaningless to raise the question of whether a belief in "student power" is incompatible with the professional's concept of peer evaluation and control. Perhaps the major upshot of this discussion is that it will remain difficult to resolve the problem of the alleged incompatibility of unionism and professionalism until we arrive at a wider consensus as to what constitutes professionalism in the academic world.
?'he Specter of Stnndnrdiz,ntio~z
Uniformity is widely lamented in academic circles. Among professors anything that smacks of homogenization, bureaucratization, or redundancy is given short shrift-at least verbally. Because they are trained for "straight" thinking rather than "stoned" thinking, professors tend to concentrate on the differences among things rather than the similarities. Furthermore, the!-sometimes attempt to create or enhance differences: the\-believe it is essential to rank students on academic performance; the\-believe the distinctions among assistant, associate, and full professors make sense; the!-believe in the existence of faculty salary disparities ranging from, say, $10,000 .to $40,000; they believe that a good universit!-contains a wide diversit\-of schools and colleges, that a good college offers a wide variety of programs, and that a good department offers a wide variet!-of courses. A11 sich assumptions, as it turns out, are eminently debatable.
Given this predilection toward "diversity," it is not at all surprising that straight thinkers such as Dressel and Faricv should become apprehensive that facult!-unions will undermine "departmental autonomy" and thereby create a rancorous uniformity. A high degree of uniformit!-, they sa!-, \vill probably develop in salary patterns that are based upon degrees, rank, and years of service. Cniforniity leaves no room for merit recognition and hence no incentive for a faculty menlber to do more than is required. Typically the qualit!-of departments has varied greatly across a university, but enforced uniformity in salaries is likely to bring all to the same level of distinction-or mediocrity.
There are several good answers to that argument. First, what is sacrosanct about departmental autonomy? Fnculty autonom!-does not necessitate departmental autonomy. Gus Tvler, for instance, writes about the existence of powerful autonomous faculty unions during the Aliddle Ages, an era in which the departmental system had not vet been conjured up in the mind of any man. Secondly, to what extent are contemporary academic departments in fact autonomous? (Let that question remain rhetorical!) Third1~-, unionism does not preclude (although perhaps it should) substantial variation in salaries, the differential rewarding of "merit," and a host of perquisites, privileges, and immunities in the absence of which faculty members would find life a lot less exasperating and entertaining. In addition, there are man>-varieties of uniformit\-. Uniformity of salaries is one thing; uniformity of educational philosophies, course content, classroom procedures, and evaluative techniques is something altogether different. In a normal academic career one encounters scores of men and women (even on non-union campuses!) who feel that the major difficultv with higher education todav is that -to repeat a typical example-it permits the total anarchy of a multi-sectioned course in whlch each professor is free to choose his own textbook! There is no reason, of course, why facultv unions cannot support and promulgate an esperimental attitude; the creation b f such an attitude, in fact, should be one of their major goals.
Under prevailing conditions some departments do have sufficient autonomy, even when presunlablv constrained by union contracts, that thev are able to commit the f o l l o w i~~g 'described bv Dressel and Fjricv: .excesses 1ucidl~-For those [professors] not on continuing contract, appointments must be made for a full year, and dismissal after the first year must be supported by unsatisfactory evaluations for two of the previous three semesters. T h e effect is that frequently lecturers are routinely given unsatisfactory ratings, to protect departments from having to offer them a continuing contract. T h e department chairman is in the unhappy position of having to initiate unsatisfactory ratings on faculty members who are performing satisfactorily.
,4nd then, in ironic juxtaposition:
Although in many universities, tenure is often restricted because of the need to limit the size of the tenured faculty, prevent inbreeding, or maintain a proper range of specialties in the tenured facult!-, still, departmental autonomy is restricted when such decisions can be regarded as a grievance.
The exercise of "departmental autonomv" through the manipulation and deliberate falsification of performance ratings in the interest of bureaucratic expediency is precisely the sort of barbaritv the unions are designed to stop. Such actions sl~ozrldbecome grievances; in a union of professional men, they must become grievances. Dressel and Faricv mav lament the fact that "insistence upon publicly presentable and defensible eiidence might result in failure to make critical and probably controversial decisions,'' but if the evidence is n o t presentable and defensible then no adverse decision should be taken. And, we hasten to add, departmental actions based on evidence that is neither presentable nor defensible are not invariably taken in pursuit of greater diversitv.
Ladd and Lipset's position on "standardization" is similar to that of Dressel and Faricy. Unionization, they claim, "inevitably fosters policies that seek to eliminate salari differentials among those in a given-job category, other than those linked to seniority," and such policies, it is alleged, ". . . will probablv scrve more to downgrade the relative standing of the high achievers . . . than td bring the lesser ones up to the level of their more affluent competitors." In explaining the relative "lack of support for faculty unionism" at major colleges and universities-a generalization for which the evidence is not at all convincing-Ladd and Lipset claim that "the more research-oriented culture of academe is inherently meritocratic. Faculty are rewarded with tenure, promotions, and salaries from within, and b v research grants and honorific rewards from without, according to judg-W i l l U n i o n s .%fake U s Less Professional? ments made about their scholarlv activities. There is an important clash, then, between the interests and values df achieving academics and the normative system of trade unionism." These arguments parallel those of Dressel and Faricv in their uncritical acceptance of one of the leading idols of the academic tribe: ;hat there is a close commensurability between merit and reward. JVe have presented substantial evidence elsewhere showing that many alleged measures of merit have little impact on salaries. Furthermore, the "merit svstem" typicallv operates in secrecv, so that it is usuallv imposs~ble for individual facultv members to determine whether their own ''merit" is reflected in the rewards' conferred on them. Ladd and Lipset's claim that salary standardization will tend to "downgrade" those who are currently "high achievers" (whatever that means) is apparently based on the untenable hypothesis that the anticipation of reward motivates faculty members to cultivate merit. Dressel and Faricy implicitly accept the same hypothesis when they assert that standardization would eliminate the "incentive for a facultv member to do more than is required.'' -Again, empirical research on this matter indicates that the number of factors that influence faculty salaries is so large, and the salary determination process itself so submerged in secrecy, that the typical facultv member is rarelv in a position to determine whether his efforts ha;e brought fbrth a just reward: It may well be that the absence of such knowledge produces the empirical finding (in m\-own research) of a lack of relationship between anticipated rewards and th; cultivation of merit. On the other hand, it is quite possible that professors derive a much larger part of their motivation to excel from their own professional goals and standards than they do from the anticipation of financial reward or high professorial rank; this may be particularly true of professors committed to unionization, whose professional standards, as we have seen, are uneucelled. It is one of the myriad ironies of academia that tenure arrangements are rarelv criticized b v champions of the "merit system," even though tenure clearlv reduces any "incentive" a facultv member mav feel to strive for job security..~ritics of tenure, on the other hand, often attempt to buttress their arguments with the claim that the assurance of continuous employment, because it removes an incentive, leads professors t o "slack off." But, again, the small amount of evidence available on thls issue indicates that, other matters (age, vears of experience, degrees held, etc.) held constant, tenured professors the teaching function (as assessed b y students) just as well as non-tenured professors.
It mav be true, as Robert K. Carr and Daniel K. VanEvck argue in their Collectiite Bargaining Comer to the Campus, that "collective bargaining has long been recognized as exerting a leveling influence." In this context, however, leveling refers primarily to a reduction of economic differentials; it does not necessarily imply reduced opportunities for experimentation with curricula, classroom procedures, evaluation techniques, various forms of university governance, and so forth. All such issues are eminentlv bargainable, and astute faculty unions could well ensure increased variability in a wide range of activities. Unionization, in fact, does not even preclude the existence of a "merit" system: Carr and VanEvck explain that the unionization of svmphony orchestras has not altogether elimhated a system of differential rewards for "stars" and for those who occupy the first few chairs of each section of an orchestra. T h e mere fact, however, that we can have a merit system does not mean that we must have a merit system. Furthermore, there is a major contradiction in the position of those critics of unionization who, on the one hand, have argued against standardization, but who also have lamented the possibilit!-that a narrow definition of bargaining unitse.g., separating full-time from part-time faculty, professional from semi-professional emplovees, etc.-will tend to create "fragmentation." The critics cannot have it both wavs: fragmentation arising from narrow definitions of bargaining units w~l l tend 'to produce diversity as each bargaining unit pursues its own interests unhampered by any need ;o sell its position to a wider constituency. Collective bargaining is expensive, and a variety of contracts negotiated b y various constituencies will increase costs substantially, but such variety, one hopes, will tend to prevent the more onerous forms of siandardization.
Insofar as "accountability" produces standardization, faculty unions may become a major bulwark against standardization. The upsurge of cost-benefit analysis will probably give strong i~npetus to the faculty unionization movement. -1rguments against faculty unions, as we have seen, usuallv begin with the assumption that unionization is somehow incompatible with ;he professional status of college and university teachers, and that it would somehow damage a benign public image cultivated over man\-decades. This argument rarely pauses to raise questions about the strength of attitudes among those professors who do in fact join unions; nor is it concerned with whether their "militance" may be in part a reaction against perceived threats to professional standards. Among high school teachers, militance and unionization are often an affirmation of professional standards which are thought to be threatened by, say, creeping bureaucracy and a rigid adherence to rules and arbitrary procedures on the part of principals and other supervisors. Ronald G. orw win's survev of "militant" hish school teachers showed that:
. . . teaching must, by the very nature of professionalization, achieve more authority over the policies that govern its work. But school systems are bureaucracies designed to control and standardize work and otherwise constrain the authority of employees. hlilitancy is the expected outcome of this clash between what are essentially competing principles of organization integral to organizations themselves.
Corwin offers some provocative speculations about the social forces that underlie both bureaucratization and increasing teacher militancy in pursuit of "professional" goals:
. . . in contrast to the picture of red tape and control so often evoked by the term "bureaucracy," . . . autonomy, tension, and conflict are at least as characteristic of modern organizations as rules and supervision. 'The paradox is that even as society becomes more highl>-organized, conflict appears to be increasing. . . .
It would be hard to find a more perfect summary of recent trends within the universities, where the increasing emphasis on "accountabilitv" as a partial means of discouraging endemic conflict apparently has given strong impetus to facultv Will U?zious .Woke Us Less Professio.ilal? 9 militance 2nd unionization efforts.
Bureaucratization is one of the most important devices employed by administrators to keep conflict from getting out of control. The harried administrator will be quick to invoke "accountability"; he will insist that all staff and line relations be sharplv defined, and that a "codification committee" make it perfectlv clear who has authoritv, under given circumstances, over whom; he will insist that lines of authoritv not only be unambiguous, but that thev be frequently exercised through the practice of making reports to one's superiors or otherwise showing the appropriate deference. But such an administrative style often encounters strong resistance; and if an authoritarian bureaucrat responds to resis--tance b v becoming more authoritarian, we witness the explosive dynamic of a vicious circle, producing a rapid escalation. Among Corwin's high school teachers such escalation processes were not uncommon, and it is reasonable to suppose that similar processes could occur among college teachers. A recent study b y Peter AI. Blau, in fact, indicates that the larger, more prestigious colleges and universities are freer of the rigidities of bureaucracy than the smaller, less prominent institutions. If the recent emphasis on "accountability" and cost-benefit economics filters up to the more prestigious institutions, unionization efforts at such institutions probabl\-will receive strong impetus and it may become possible to "translate attitudks into behaviorn-attitudes which, as we have seen, are as favorable toward unionization as those which prevail at the "lower-tier" institutions.
Ladd and Lipset repeatedly allude to the alleged incompatibilitv of unionism and professionalism, and in s o doing thev continuallv commit the "ecological fallacv," i.e., thev assume, in a classic non-sequitur, that since unions have caught on primarilv at "lower tier" institutions, they must necessarilv be most attractive to the least professional facultv members. "1f-there is a link," tilev claim, "between the independence and high status of the professions and hostiliiv to the spirit of unionism . . ., then the current growth of facultv unionism would seem to indicate that the professoriate is becoming 'less professional'. . . ." In a later contest, we read that "college teaching at places of low academic standing less resembles a profession, so facultv in such positions therebv see less of a clash between their status and the norms of unionism." Again, a few pages later: "The least professional-i.e., 'profession-like1-sectors of academe are the most supportive of faculty unions." IYhile usage of the terms "professional" and "profession-like" is highlv ambiguous, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Ladd and Lipset have fallen i n t i the trap of assuming that, since unionism has caught on most stronglv at institutions where there are relative1.r-few opportunities for "professional" development and where the encroachments of bureaucracy are often perceived as a threat to professionalism, there must be a corresponding lack of professionalism at such institutions on the part of facultv members who support unions. It is hard to find any other interpretation fo; the statement that the growth of unionism indicates that faculty members have become less professional. An alternative
hypothesis holds tha;zr~zio~zization at the less prestigious institutions is most likely to be supported b y those faculty wzewzbers w h o have the highest professional standards and the strongest izstigation toward irnprovi~zg their professio~;7al status,
i.e., faculty members who perceive the lack of opportunity and the encroachments of bureaucracv as a deplorable condition. Such an aiternative hypothesis has the virtue of being consistent with data indicating that unionized faculty members are more likely to define themselves as "intellectuals" and to be com~nitted to a "broad liberal education" as opposed t o "specialized training"; it is consistent with the finding that, insofar as scholarly involvement has any direct impact on unionism, it tends to be in a positive direction; it is consistent with Corwin's studies of militance among secondary school teachers, a militance so bound up with high professional standards that Convin calls it "militant professionalism"; it is even consistent, finally, with Ladd and Lipset's speculation that unionization is motivated, in part, by increased "bureaucratization" of higher education which has "reduced the sense of collegialitv between faculty and administrators," and by "the fact that teachers at lower-tier institutions typically have less of the independence and self-regulation associated with being members of a profession; that they have less personal standing and bargaining power; and that they are not nearly so well appointed in salary and various perquisites of academic life." The "professional standards" of individhals faculty members, in other words, cannot be interred from the standards implicit in thee structures and procedures that surround and constrain them-such an inference commits the ecological fallacy. Faculty members may be genuinely dissatisfied with their surroundings largely because of their lofiy professional^ standards. It should be noted, finallv, that there is some dissension among faculty members as to what constitutes high professional standards; the final section of ;his article, in fact, argues that the most important task of facultv unions is that of finding new ways of defining professional standards and professional responsibilities.
The possibility that faculty unions, in part, result from perceived threats to professional standards has not been lost on the more perceptive scholars in the field. J. IV. Garbarino, professor of business administration at Berkeley and an expert on collective bargaining, questions the thesis that the popularity of unionism at less prestigious institutions is due solely to the fact that individual facultv members at such institutions have low professional standards:
Despite this pattern, some skepticism as to the significance of the quality variable as an explanation of the incidence of unionism is in order. Not only is quality difficult to define and measure, but it appears likely that it is a proxy for a range of other variables which explain the propensity to organize. That is, the popular explanation for the inverse association of quality and unionism rests on the values of professionalisn~ or similar attributes. U'e suspect, however, that other variables more directly related to the environment and working conditions of faculty (e.g., the degree of participation in governance, work load, and other elements of status and privilege) are likely to be more enduring explanations.
And in Sanford Kadish's opinion, even the strike tactic may be justifiable in situations where faculty members have been victimized by a massive assault upon their professional standards. Finally, William B. Boyd, a college president, recognizes that faculty unions may be a7way of restorinia lost autonomy:
A fourth cause for unionization is the search for new means of asserting professional power in areas where faculty tend to be losing to outside forces. When Will Unions Make Us Less Professional? 11 universities were autonomous or ignored by the public, faculties could work out power equations on campus through traditional academic means. For the most part this meant contests with the administration and, recently, with student demands for a share in decisions which were once the prerogative of faculties. These familiar battlefields of power are no longer the most important ones. The development of statewide systems, of new bureaucracies designed to control higher education, has made serious inroads into the independence of universities and the authority formerly accorded faculties. This threat to institutional antonomy has helped stimulate professorial interest in organization for collective power.
It mav turn out, in other words, that unionism and professionalism are complementarj, not incompatible. Such a conclusion would not be unprecedented: a favorite indoor sport among academicians is that of ascertaining, enumerating, and promulgating an awareness of all the activities allegedly precluded if one has received the call to become a scholar, and as often as not these alleged incompatibilities turn out to be spurious. Thus, it is said that if you wish to be a scholar, you cannot become a political activist; if you wish to be a scholar, you cannot be ileavilv involved in religion-witness the famous studies of fifty years ago by James Leuba; if you wish to be a scholar, you must forswear all romantic involvements with students; if you wish to be a scholar, chances are vou will not be a good teacher-if you publish, yozr may not perish, but your teaching surely will. In my own empirical researches I haie examined, thus far, the relationship between religious involvement and scholarlv productivity, and there is no incompatibility. Hopefully, it will come as good news to the counterculture that one can indulgeqin irrational thought patterns and still be a successful scholar, even a successful scientist. Similarlv, the more productive scholars are more likely to have received awards for !good. teaching. Among a dozen empirical studies of this relationship, only one showed even a small degree of incompatibility between good teaching and good scholarship. Finallv, I offer the hypothesis that political involvement does not preclude good scholarship, and that it is possible to teach the profoundest lessons to students with whom one is romantically involved. W e may not be able to grade such students objectively, but, as I've argued elsewhere, grading and good teaching are incompatible.
Ill. A Needed Trarzsfor?tzation
It will come as a surprise to nobody to hear that, in recent decades, unions have become meek, mild, and manageable. But this change is an integral part of a much larger change toward a new form of industrial society. In his remarkable book T h e N e w Industrial State, John Kenneth Galbraith has shown that Marxists commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness when they speak of the pervasive internal contradictions of the American industrial svstem. O n the other hand, contradictions involving the integration of the industrial system with other sectors of society, as well as contradictions at the international level (the latter totally ignored bv Galbraith), are a whole new can of worms, and Marxists should have little difficulty in accepting the premise that the internal contradictions of the American industrial system merely have been displaced to the supra-industrial or international level. It is arguable, and Galbraith so argues, that the politico-military-industrial sector of American society, the dominant sector, is indeed a smoothlv functioning machine. The supply of capital is largely controlled by the corporations that use it; a vast "technostructure" provides the needed technical expertise and managerial guidance to make the corporations eminently adaptable; "workers" at all levels are taught to "identifv" with the corporation emp10)-ing them and with the manifest goals of the ~o x -~o r a t e svstern; prices and markets (aggregate demand) are thoroughlv managed with thk full cooperation of government; universities have been transformed into manpower channeling agencies and research and development departments. These, then, are the essential structural contours of the emerging industrial svstem, and the unions are now chieflv of value to the system insofar as they contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of these no&. And ~o n t r i b u~e they do: by "helping to frame the rules and by participating in their administration"; b y "helping to prevent discontent and, therewith, a sense of alienation"; b v "aiding the accommodation of technological change"; by assuming "the principal role of winning approval of the policy of regulating aggregate demand"; bv helping to "standardize wage costs between different industrial firms and to insure that changes in wages will occur at approximately the same time." If the corporations did not have unions, thev surely would have to invent them.
The advantages of such unions-Galbraith calls them "ministerial" unions because their limited authorin-is delegated b v higher powers-have not been lost on the Inore perceptive college and universitv administrators; the danger, then, is that newly emerging facult\-unions will be readily co-opted by those charged with the management of educational institutions. T'he avoidance of co-optation will necessitate efforts to sustain a high level of militance, a conflict orientation, and an evolving set of demands perceived as exorbitant by administration. Hopefull\-, the demands will evolve bv becoming broader in scope. The CarnegieIACE suriev provides some encouragi;lg findings on the capacity of professors devoted to unionism to define their goals in ways that go be!-ond economics. Comparing professors who support unionism with those who do not, we found very small differences in attitudes concerning salary matters. Forty-seven percent of the A F T members, for instance, consider thkir salaries "poor" or "fair," compared with forty-five percent of the non-members; disgruntlement over salaries, then, does not distinguish between members and non-members of AFT. l y e saw earlier that salaries have little impact on attitudes toward unionization. O n the other hand, among A F T members twenty-four percent are dissatisfied with teaching loads, compared with thirteen percent among non-members; in addition, A F T members are substantially more concerned about administrative "autocracy" within departments than are non-members.
Future generations of professors, one hopes, will insist that faculty unions begin playing down the traditional economic issues in favor of a host of newly emerging issues vastly more significant than bread and butter. The "futurology" industrv has assuied us for many years that the more advanced industrial societies are entering a new era in which incredible technological advances will transform the social and ps\-chological foundations of our existence. Alvin Toffler's Futzrre Shock warns tha; if we do not prepare ourselves for these inevitable transformalVill Uniol~s ,llirke U s Less Professio~zal? 1 3 tions we will begin to suffer on a massive scale the adverse symptoms of severe psychological stress and "information overload.'' Future shock is the temporal counterpart of culture shock, a severe emotional affliction suffered by those who travel to foreign lands and evpose themselves to a strange culture too abruptly or without an adequate prior knowledge of what to expect and how to adapt to it. Such anticipatorv knowledge is allegedlv the university's business; experimentation with future-life styles could also be-come the university's business. L%nd yet, while historv departments are found nearly everywhere, futurologv departments-or even serious programs-are practically unheard of, and universities, in Toffler's view, remain full of anachronisms:
. . . the whole idea of assembling masses of students (raw material) to be processed by teachers (workers) in a centrally located school (factory) was a stroke of industrial genius. The whole administrative hierarchy of education, as it grew up, followed the model of industrial bureaucracy. The very organization of knowledge into permanent disciplines was grounded on industrial assumptions. Children marched from place to place and sat in assigned stations. Bells rang to announce changes to tinie.
The inner life of the school thus became an anticipatory mirror, a perfect introduction to industrial society. The most criticized features of education todaythe regimentation, lack of individualization, thc rigid systems of seating, grouping, grading and marking, the authoritarian role of the teacher-are precisely those that made mass public education so effective an instrument of adaptation for its place and time.
At a time when students should be deciding whether Shulamith Firestone, in T h e Dialectic of Sex, is correct in asserting that ( 1 ) pregnancv is barbaric, ( 2 ) gestation within artificial environments is the wave of the future, and ( 3 ) parenthood, as we know it, is not, those who run universities are still agitating themselves about whether the unlversitv should continue the farce of trying to plav an in loco parelztis role vis-a-vis voung adults who are soplu5ticated enough to read Shulamith Flrestone. At a time when knowledge, especiallv technical knowledge, is outmoded almost before it is disseminated, we are still-tinkering with a nineteenth-century curriculum. Even the word "curriculum" is ironic: coming from the Latin word meaning "a running," it now carries a connotation of being a static, sterile bodv of knowledge which each student must trv to ingest whole. Prevailing classro.om techniques are informed mainly by the pedagogy of the Aliddle Ages, when the master possessed the onlv book; even print culture, which Alarshall AlcLuhan \.ears ago pronounced
has not yet fully arrived in the college classroom where it is a common practice for the professor to assign a book which he does not use at all or which he does use in a way that suggests that he still sees himself as a medieval schoolmaster who possesses the onlv copy. And finallv the grading system, which involves parents, pressure, and prodigious labor, is fuilv as barbaric as pregnancy.
~a c h t v unions should develop positions on these sorts of issues, speak out forcefullv, and back up their propaganda with action.
d n the other hand, one way in which professorial unions might profitably emulate industrial unions (as described bv Galbraith) is by taking steps to expand "effective demand" for their services. Not the least lamentable feature of contemporary higher education is the fact that, at anv given time, the recipients of its services are almost entirely white, middle-class, between ages seventeen and twenty-one, and intent on being properly certified. (Certification, of course, is largelv device for increasing aggregate demand, but it is hopefully not the sort of device that will be advocated by the ideal professors' union.) Although one hates to see professors become inkolved in advertising, it would not be indecorous for the academic profession to point out in a massive public relations campaign (for which management would be expected to pick up the tab) that it is selling a commodity that, unlike Coca-Cola or the latest fastback or Galbraith's toaster that prints monograms on your toast, is indispensible and should therefore be made readily available to eberybody including the non-affluent, the non-white, the non-young, and the non-urban. Even the "non-literate" and the "non-educable." It mav be necessarv, on occasion, that the campus be taken where the people are, but even medical cioctors in the earlv davs of their unionization efforts were not unaccustomed to making house calls. L$ssuming that a few automobiles could be wrestled away from the athletic departments, there is no reason why professors could not take their services to the hinterlands as a part of a serious "continuing education" program. The next logical step, of course, would be for professors to gain a modicum of control over admission policies and to take measures necessary to eliminate the spurious motivations for attending college created bv the "certification game." Like abolishing Inany, if not most, degrees. Such wiriiome faculty unions as these would address the'mselves almost entirely to non-economic issues and therefore presumablv would receive the plaudits even of the staid and proper American Associa;ion of Universitv Professors, which has only recently decided, due to popular demand of its constituencv, that serious faculty unions mav well be a force worth co-opting-as long as they keep the primarv focus on non-economic issues such as academic freedom.
